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INTRODUCTION 
The East German secret service, more than any other Eastern bloc 
service, exercises the bulk of its activities in the Federal Republic of Ger-
many (FRG). Until 1945 the two Germanies shared a common past and 
culture and Germans in East and West still speak the same language. 
Consequently, it is much easier for East German agents to penetrate 
West German society and recruit West German citizens than it is for the 
Soviet KGB. Of the roughly 4000 Communist spies in West Germany, 
some 2500-3000 originate in East Germany. ' 
Most of the East German espionage is conducted by the Ministry of 
State Security (MfS) at the Normannenstrasse in East Berlin. Military in-
telligence operations are chiefly conducted by the Ministry of National 
Defence (MfNV). Founded in February 1950 — five months after the 
creation of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) — the Ministry's 
main purpose was to contribute to consolidating the new Communist 
regime imposed on the population in the Soviet controlled zone of Ger-
many. About 80% of the Ministry's activities continue to be focussed on 
internal control and repression and only 20% of its work is devoted to 
external espionage.2 As an organ of the GDR Ministerial Council the 
MfS is to protect "the socialist order of state and society against hostile 
attacks on the sovereignty and territorial of the GDR, the socialist 
achievements and the peaceful life of the people."3 
The Soviets had a strong hand in the creation of the East German 
state security apparatus. They realized that none of their client regimes 
would survive without an effective deterrent to freedom and that the 
mere presence of the Red Army would not suffice. Consequently, the 
strong bond of brotherhood between the Soviet "Checkists" (the 
"Cheka" or "Extraordinary Committee for Combating Counter-
revolutionaries and Sabotage" was the Leninist successor to the 
notorious Czarist secret police, Okhrana) has been emphasized 
throughout. 
Inititially, the Ministry of State Security (MfS) had an entirely 
domestic function. Espionage operations abroad were conducted by the 
"Institute of Economic Research" (Institut fuer Wirt-
schaftwissenschaftliche Forschung, IWF) created in 1951 and formally 
residing under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Political responsibility 
was placed in the hands of an under-minister, Anton Ackermann, but 
day-to-day activities were run by Markus Wolf — a promising young 
man who enjoyed the full confidence of the Soviets. However, in 1953 
IWF was incorporated in the Ministry of the Interior and Wolf became 
head of "Chief Department XV." The Ministry of State Security 
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temporarily ceased to exist. All its duties were taken over by the Interior 
Ministry until 1955 when the Ministry of State Security was recreated. A 
year later all foreign intelligence operations were delegated to the MfS's 
new "Chief Department of Intelligence" (Hauptverwaltung 
Aufklaerung, HVA) under the direction of Markus Wolf. Erich Mielke 
became the new Minister of State Security in 1957. 
Throughout the 1950s Soviet and East German espionage operations 
in West Germany were substantial. Wolf soon got a reputation of being 
the Eastern Bloc's most efficient and dangerous intelligence chief. Under 
the direction of KGB general Ivan Alexandrovitch Serov, large numbers 
of East German agents were sent to West Germany, most of whom were 
spotted as agents. An estimated ten percent who remained undetected 
still represent a considerable threat. One well-informed source told the 
author that as a result of the Serov operation there may be many more 
than the estimated 3000 East German agents.' 
The Soviets also continue to undertake considerable activity in West 
Germany, which they consider their main European target. The Soviet 
network is, partially at least, independent of the East German network. 
Both Soviets and East Germans managed to penetrate the West German 
government apparatus, political parties and counter-intelligence service 
with great effect. One of the Soviets' early successes was the planting of a 
double agent in the West German Federal Intelligence Service (BND). 
Before his arrest in 1961 Heinz Felfe had risen to the position of head of 
the BND's counter-espionage department dealing with communist af-
fairs. Felfe, who recently published his memoirs and now lives in East 
Berlin, had been recruited by Soviet intelligence as early as 1949. Two 
years later he joined the newly founded "Organisation Gehlen" — the 
predecessor of the BND. Trusted by his superiors, and particularly by 
BND chief Reinhard Gehlen, he managed to climb to a very high position 
within the BND thus being able to provide the Soviets with the names of 
many BND agents operating in the East.5 Further, both the Soviets and 
the East Germans run informants and spies within some of the establish-
ed political parties. One very high level Soviet agent was recruited in the 
sixties, or possibly even earlier, and provided the Soviets with unique in-
formation on German negotiations with the East during the Chancellor-
ship of Willy Brandt. The politician involved still plays a prominent role 
in West German politics.6 
THE "CHIEF DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE" (HVA) 
The MfS's "Chief Department of Intelligence" (HVA) is generally 
considered the most efficiently run Eastern Bloc secret service. The 
Soviet KGB relies heavily on the HVA, particularly on its ability to ob-
tain militarily significant Western technology. HVA-officers are 
recruited from among the most loyal elements of the East German 
Socialist Unity Party youth movement (FDJ) and the party itself. Most 
of them receive higher education. Recruits first become unofficial 
"assistants" (Inoffizielle Mitarbeiter, IM) during which time they are 
thoroughly tested before actually joining the service. The quality of 
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HVA-officers has steadily risen over the years. Unofficial assistants do 
not necessarily have to become full-fledged HVA operatives. As recruits 
from other ministries, or the academic community, or as students, the 
highly useful unofficial assistants, sometimes widely respected scholars 
of the East German Academy of Sciences who during international scien-
tific forums and conferences perform significant duties for their MfS 
"control officer" {Fuerungsoffizier, FO), make themselves indispensible 
to HVA officers. Additionally, control officers also run a number of 
agents in the West. 
An important role is played by so-called "agents of influence" who 
occupy important positions in Western governmental, economic or scien-
tific institutions or in the media. Not all of the agents of influence are ac-
tually recruited by the HVA; only rarely is such an agent of influence a 
HVA officer. This was the case, for example, with Guenter Guillaume, 
the legendary East German spy and confidant of former West German 
chancellor Willy Brandt. 
HVA officers in West Germany often assume new identities using 
fictitious names, or more usually, the names of dead persons. In order to 
be sufficiently credible such "illegals" are provided with "legends," that 
is, stories about their personal backgrounds and reasons for their being 
in the West. As an example one could cite the man using the name of 
"Peter Kraus" who arrived in Bonn in 1965. He claimed to be an 
engineer who had just returned from South Africa and that it was his in-
tention to resume his studies at Bonn university. His real mission, 
however, was to recruit female secretaries in well-placed positions in 
government ministries in Bonn. In June 1966 he became the control of-
ficer of Helge Berger, chief secretary in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.7 
Numerous other instances could be given. 
That the functions and duties of the HVA are manifold is apparent 
from its detailed structure and operational focus. There are at least fif-
teen departments {Abteilungen), all subdivided into smaller departments 
or units {Referate).* 
Department I concerns itself with the penetration of the 
Federal Government of West Germany, that is the 
Federal Chancellor's office, the government ministries 
and other governmental institutions. 
Department II targets political parties, their organiza-
tions and members of parliament. 
Department III concentrates on espionage activities in 
other West European countries. Before 1968 the scope 
of Department II was much wider: it focussed on the 
whole (capitalist) Western world, with the exception of 
Germany. With the increasing emphasis on HVA opera-
tions in the United States, Canada and the Third World, 
it became mandatory to create two new Departments, 
viz. Department XI (North America) and Department 
XII (Third World). The remaining staff of Department 
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HI could now concentrate on Western Europe. There 
are subdepartments dealing with each European country 
or group of countries (such as the Benelux). Austria is a 
special target. 
Department IV deals with military intelligence, especial-
ly military-strategic planning. It is not clear whether 
these activities coincide with those of the Defence 
Ministry. Conflict of competence between civil and 
military intelligence services is common practice in the 
Communist Party states. 
Department V concerns itself with economic analysis. 
Department VI plays a key role in training and in-
filtrating agents into West Germany. It is responsible 
for the so-called "illegals" and agents posing as 
refugees. 
Department VII deals with intelligence analysis. 
Department VIII is the operational techniques depart-
ment. It prepares, for example, forged travel documents 
and provides all forms of technical assistance to HVA 
operatives such as wire-tapping equipment, hidden 
microphones, etc. 
Department IX is in charge of counter-intelligence. The 
chief target is the Federal Intelligence Service (BND). 
Department X deals with "disinformation." It prepares 
and floats fabricated stories, forgeries of official 
documents of Western governments with a view to 
deceiving public opinion in the target country and 
disrupting its relations with other countries. The term 
used for these activities is "active measures." Active 
measures are sometimes coordinated with the Soviet 
KGB and/or the other Eastern bloc services. The KGB 
is estimated to spend some 300 million West German 
Marks on active measures.' 
Department XI coordinates the increasing activities in 
the United States and Canada. 
Department XII concerns itself with the Third World. 
Departments XIII (basic research and nuclear physics), 
XIV (electronics and micro-electronics), and XV (con-
struction of engines and vehicles) are the "operational 
departments" of the "Sector Science and Technology" 
(Sektor Wissenschaft und technik, SWT). This unit was 
an outgrowth of Department V in 1970 when the need 
for more scientific and technological intelligence gather-
ing was felt.10 The chief occupation of the SWT is 
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industrial espionage with increasing emphasis on high 
technology, especially computer and nuclear 
technologies. In addition to West Germany, Japan and 
the United States are major targets. A former H VA of-
ficer, Werner Stiller, who defected to West Germany in 
1979 revealed much about the successful H VA attempts 
to obtain embargoed technology. He worked for 
Department XIII which was subdivided into four 
smaller departments (Referate) dealing with (nuclear) 
physics (Subunit I), microbiology and bacteriological 
warfare (Subunit II), chemistry (Subunit III) and the 
United States (Subunit IV). The head of the Sector 
Science and Technology was, and presumably still is, 
Horst Vogel. 
MARKUS WOLF AND ERICH MIELKE 
Markus Wolf and Erich Mielke have determined both the quality 
and quantity of East German intelligence operations for more than thirty 
years. In February 1987 it was officially announced in the East German 
party newspaper Neues Deutschland that Colonel General Markus Wolf 
was "retiring from active service at the Ministry for State Security at his 
own request."" Rumors soon spread that Wolf retired for health 
reasons. German intelligence sources claimed that Wolf was suffering 
from the Bekhterev disease which affects the spinal column.12 However, 
one month after he had retired Wolf looked quite fit when he attended a 
concert in the Palace of Friedrichstadt.13 Others, therefore, believe that 
Wolf's retirement was due to a decision made by East German party 
leader Erich Honecker who was thought to disagree with Wolf's views 
and lifestyle. Moreover, Wolf reportedly could not get on very well with 
his immediate boss, State Security Minister Erich Mielke.14 Wolf was 
succeeded by his former deputy, Major General Werner Grossmann, 
considered to be "one of the Eastern bloc's most dangerous Western ex-
perts. " , s 
Wolf never had been a party careerist; he concentrated fully on his 
job. Invariably, he relied on his KGB friends in Moscow and they, in 
turn, fully trusted Wolf. Markus Johannes Wolf (1923) grew up in 
Stalinist Russia and acquired Soviet citizenship. He received his training 
at the COMINTERN school at Kushnarenkovo and returned to Ger-
many in 1945. After a brief period of journalism and diplomatic service, 
the Soviets pushed Wolf into an intelligence career and in 1956 he 
became the chief of the newly formed HVA. By 1960 Wolf could call 
himself Deputy Minister of State Security. Unlike Erich Mielke, Wolf 
was never elected into the socialist Unity Party's Central Committee - a 
prerequisite for being a candidate for the post of State Security Minister. 
In April 1986, Wolf was again by-passed. Instead, the eleventh party 
congress granted another MfS General, Rudolf Mittig, full Central Com-
mittee membership." By then it has become clear that Mittig, and not 
Wolf, was the most likely candidate to succeed the aging Mielke. This 
may well have contributed to his decision to resign ten months later. 
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Erich Mielke, born in 1907, was an active member of the pre-war 
Communist Party of Germany (KPD) which he joined in 1925. Mielke's 
party duties were mainly confined to guarding the party's headquarters 
in Berlin. In August 1931, after Mielke shot a policeman in the back, the 
party provided an escape route for him and Mielke finally ended up in 
the Soviet Union. A Berlin court convicted him in absentia. When in 
1945 Mielke returned to Berlin, the public prosecutor issued a warrant 
against him but the Soviets intervened on Mielke's behalf and the public 
prosecutor had to flee to West Berlin." 
Mielke was close to the previous East German party leader Walter 
Ulbricht, but his relationship with the present party leader Erich 
Honecker is not always clear. Honecker evidently did not hamper 
Mielke's career. In 1970 Mielke first became a candidate member of the 
Politburo, then, in 1976, a full member. In 1980 he received the addi-
tional rank of army general. 
Mielke is believed to be a doctrinal hardliner and, occasionally, he 
may have clashed with Erich Honecker over the latter's policy of rap-
prochement towards West Germany. Mielke obviously has feared that 
too many contacts between the populations of East and West Germany 
might adversely affect domestic security. Wolf's HVA, on the other 
hand, tended to favor an extension of inter-German relations since these 
would provide new opportunities for recruiting West German citizens 
and conducting other espionage missions in the West. 
More recently Mielke and Honecker have been united in rejecting 
Soviet party leader Gorbachev's new openness (glasnost) and the release 
of political dissidents. Whether Wolf, in contrast to Mielke, supported 
the new Soviet line is not clear. Wolf's background in Stalinist Russia, 
and his refusal to criticize Stalin, would testify to the contrary. Wolf was 
said not to get along with the present KGB chief, Viktor Chebrikov, an 
ally of Gorbachev." With the KGB no longer protecting him, Wolf had 
no other option but to resign. Quite the reverse could also be possible, 
however. Hoping to exploit the West's positive response to the new 
Soviet line, Wolf and his HVA might have had the intention of further 
penetrating Western society and its institutions. This may have led to a 
serious clash with the party leadership who seemed unified in its rejection 
of glasnost, at least initially. Consequently, Honecker had Wolf remov-
ed. 
POLITICAL ESPIONAGE IN BONN: USING FEMALE 
SECRETARIES 
Political espionage operations are conducted with a view to influen-
cing the political decision-making process of the target country. The bulk 
of political espionage operations carried out by the HVA are conducted 
in Bonn. Markus Wolf introduced the method of recruiting female 
secretaries in key positions in the governmental apparatus by having 
them sexually seduced by the HVA's well-trained agents. Both HVA and 
KGB run systematic programs of "sex-espionage." Both have run 
whorehouses, escort agencies and "clubs" in major European capitals 
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and in West Berlin. The KGB term for agents with a mission to seduce 
female secretaries in Western government ministries is "swallows." 
These "swallows" or "romeos" — as they are called in East Berlin — 
are usually control officers who have penetrated West German society 
under false identities. Sometimes they claim to work for a Western in-
telligence service (false flag recruitment). Helge Berger, chief secretary in 
the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, was told by her lover that he worked for 
British intelligence and that there was nothing wrong in passing on infor-
mation to a NATO country. In most cases, however, recruited secretaries 
are sooner or later informed of their lover's true intelligence connection. 
Should she then refuse to cooperate any further, her spy/lover will in-
variably tell her that the "love relationship" will end or that she will be 
betrayed for passing on secrets to another government. By that time the 
relationship between the HVA officer and the target person will usually be 
so intimate that it would be very difficult to break loose. If the secretary's 
activities or those of her control officer are traced by West German 
counter-espionage, both usually "disappear" to East Berlin. The weak 
spot is the control officer, whose identity sooner or later is blown by 
counter-espionage. 
Sometimes, the HVA succeeds in planting a professional intelligence 
officer in a key position in a government ministry or a political organiza-
tion. When Guenter Guillaume came to West Germany in 1956, he was ac-
companied by his wife Christel. Posing as refugees, both were profes-
sionally trained intelligence officers with a mission to penetrate the Social 
Democrat Party (SPD). Mrs. Guillaume got a secretarial job within the 
SPD and soon had access to vital information. (See below.) More cases of 
trained female intelligence officers within the West German government 
apparatus became known in 198S when a number of them suddenly 
"disappeared." 
For more than twelve years a woman using the identity of "Sonja 
Lueneburg" served as the private secretary to Dr. Martin Bangemann, 
general secretary of the ruling Free Democratic Party (FDP) and currently 
the Minister of Economic Affairs. Her position provided her with intimate 
knowledge of the party, its leadership and its role in formulating the policy 
towards the Eastern bloc (Ostpolitik). In August 1985 she suddenly disap-
peared, probably to East Berlin. Subsequent investigations showed that 
"Miss Lueneburg" had been a trained intelligence officer using profes-
sional camera equipment for photographing documents. The real Sonja 
Lueneburg was a West Berlin hairdresser who had moved to Colmar, 
France, in 1966. Some time later the other "Sonja Lueneburg" appeared 
and informed the French authorities of her intention "to return" to Ger-
many. This "Sonja Lueneburg" then settled in Frankfurt and later in 
Bonn where she started making a career in the FDP. Meanwhile the real 
Sonja Lueneburg had disappeared — presumably to East Berlin.19 Since 
the "Colmar-route" had been used frequently by the East German secret 
service to infiltrate "illegals" into West Germany, one may assume that 
the alleged Miss Lueneburg had been a HVA officer." Why she so sudden-
ly disappeared in August 1985 is not known. Someone must have informed 
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her that suspicions against her had begun to take a serious turn by the 
summer of 1985. Possibly it was someone in West German counter-
espionage. 
"Miss Lueneburg" was not the only Bonn secretary to disappear in 
1985. An East German refugee, Ursula Richter, entered the Federal 
Republic of Germany (FRG) in 1951. After some five years she returned 
to East Germany. At the end of 1964, however, another lady assuming 
the identity of the real Ursula Richter was infiltrated into West Germany. 
She used a forged passport ostensibly issued by the West German con-
sulate in Toronto.21 In 1972, she successfully applied for the position of 
bookkeeper at the Bonn-based Union of East European Expellees (Bund 
der Vertriebenen, BdV), an organization with a right-wing political tinge 
and influential in Christian Democratic circles. Although she provided 
information about German expellees from Eastern Europe living in Ger-
many, her position gave her access to important, sensitive governmental 
information. It is thought that the alleged Miss Richter could have been 
the liaison or even the leader of a spyring to which "Sonja Lueneburg" 
also belonged. She had regular meetings with HVA control officers in 
Romania, Hungary, Copenhagen and Berlin. Two days after she had 
disappeared, a Mr. Lorenz Betzing, employed by the West German army 
as a messenger, disappeared as well. Mr. Betzing had been a close friend 
of "Miss Richter's." 
The Soviet KGB runs its own network of female agents and infor-
mants in Bonn. One such well-placed agent was Miss Margret Hoeke 
who had been employed as a secretary in the Office of the Federal Presi-
dent since 1959 and was one of the very few spies who was actually 
caught in 1985. The political damage caused by Miss Hoeke, who had 
been recruited by the KGB in 1971, even superseded the Guillaume case. 
She has probably betrayed several BND agents and 
American agents in Moscow. The BND had agents in 
high Soviet positions, whose reports to the federal presi-
dent and the federal chancellor could be read by Miss 
Hoeke, including information from those closest to 
Brezhnev and Andropov. The BND was even informed 
about communist party leaders' family matters. 
It can be derived from the indictment that in case of 
war, Miss Hoeke would have belonged to the federal 
president's staff of 15 persons. She was supposed to 
handle the government's 'red telephone' for passing on 
alerts in case of war or tension." 
HIGH LEVEL POLITICAL ESPIONAGE: THE GUENTER 
GUILLAUME AFFAIR 
Political espionage by Eastern bloc secret services does not confine 
itself to female secretaries. There are examples of members of parliament 
and former government ministers who have rendered services to Soviet 
bloc intelligence. Political parties, even those representing the extreme 
right, are targeted without exception by both KGB and its sister services. 
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Special preference has been given to West European Social Democratic 
Parties. A well-informed Czech defector has revealed that both the Ger-
man and Swedish Social Democratic Parties were heavily infiltrated and 
manipulated by the Soviets, Czechs and East Germans — even to the ex-
tent of funding left wing factions within those parties." "We planned," 
Jan Sejna wrote, "to use our penetration of the European Social 
Democratic Parties to weaken their ties with the United States and 
strengthen their will for an accommodation with the Warsaw Pact."24 
High-level penetration of the West German Social Democratic Party 
(SPD) could no longer be denied after Guenther Guillaume, a trusted 
friend and advisor of SDP Chancellor Willy Brandt, had been exposed as 
an East German intelligence officer. Guillaume, a typical creation of 
HVA chief Markus Wolf, claimed to be an East German refugee when he 
entered the Federal Republic in 1955. Guillaume and his wife Christel 
settled in Frankfurt where they joined the SPD in 1957. Mrs. Guillaume 
got a position in the provincial chancellery of Hessen giving her access to 
documents on the United States armed forces stationed near Frankfurt. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Guillaume ingratiated himself with the local party 
leadership. Posing as a right-winger and criticizing the powerful left-
wing SPD youth movement ("Jusos"), Guillaume soon won the con-
fidence of George Leber, the Federal Minister of Transport and Post Ser-
vices. Due to Guillaume's incessant efforts, Leber successfully resisted 
left-wing pressure to remove him. Leber subsequently recommended 
Guillaume for a position in the Office of the Federal Chancellor 
(Bundeskanzleramt) in Bonn. At that time, however, Guillaume, with 
his East German background, was not above suspicion. In an attempt to 
prevent Guillaume's appointment in the Federal Chancellor's office, 
Gerhard Wessel, head of the Federal Intelligence Service 
(Bundesnachrichtendienst) sent a letter to the chief of the Federal 
Chancellor's office, Horst Ehmke, informing him of certain suspicions 
against Guillaume. Ehmke, who seemed to be determined to appoint 
Guillaume, then asked him whether he was a spy. Guillaume, of course, 
denied that he was and Ehmke believed him. Guillaume's security check 
was handled poorly and unprofessionally with fatal consequences.25 
Once close to Chancellor Willy Brandt, Guillaume soon managed to 
become his confidant. As Brandt's personal advisor on party affairs, 
Guillaume was able to provide East Berlin with interesting biographical 
details concerning the whole SPD leadership. Furthermore, he was well 
aware of attempts by West German counter-espionage to prevent Com-
munist penetration of the party. Guillaume was able to provide East 
Berlin with information on these attempts. As a result, a number of 
sources aiding West German counter-espionage efforts could be 
neutralized. 
Guillaume often accompanied Brandt on his trips and had detailed 
knowledge of the Chancellor's private life, such as his preference for the 
young women whom Guillaume was always willing to provide. Suspi-
cions against Guillaume grew more serious in the spring of 1973. By 
then, West German counter-espionage had found out that previously 
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intercepted code messages which the MfS had sent to "Georg" and 
"Chr." in 1956 and 1957 were most probably addressed to the Guillaume 
couple." In May 1973 Interior Minister Hans Dietrick Genscher was in-
formed of these findings and he in turn informed Chancellor Brandt. 
However, neither Brandt nor Genscher took action. On the contrary, 
Guillaume was allowed to accompany Brandt on his holiday to Norway 
where the suspected spy even got access to highly confidential letters and 
documents on NATO affairs. Brandt was later on confirm that he never 
really believed that Guillaume was a spy: "Otherwise I wouldn't have 
taken him with me."27 
Guenter and Christel Guillaume were arrested on April 24, 1974. 
Under pressure by Herbert Wehner, the SPD leader in parliament, 
Brandt was to resign a few weeks later. 
Guillaume was not the only well-placed Communist agent in Bonn. 
One Soviet defector, Arkady N. Shevchenko, claims that Valentin Falin 
once told him: "We have quite a net in Germany, you know."2' There 
are even indications that the Soviets may have had their own man in the 
Chancellor's Office. The Soviets appeared to be extremely well informed 
on the background and positions of the Brandt government during the 
complicated negotiations on the treaties with the East (Ostpolitik). The 
information leaked out of the Chancellor's office could only have come 
from a source with much more detailed access to classified information 
than Guillaume ever could have had." 
Heribert Hellenbroich, who subsequently served as president of 
both the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution (which is 
in charge of, inter alia, counter-espionage) and the Federal Intelligence 
Service, claimed recently that "probably ten, if not more, top spies sit in 
the highest positions" in Bonn government headquarters. "The GDR 
and the KGB," he added, "have made Bonn their number one field of 
operations. Entire battalions of agents are active in Bonn."30 
HANSJOACHIM TIEDGE: A DOUBLE AGENT? 
On the same day, August 23, 1985, that the East German news-
agency ADN announced that Hansjoachim Tiedge, a high-ranking West 
German counter-espionage specialist, had asked for political asylum in 
the GDR, the East German party paper Neues Deutschland referred in a 
front page article to "severe setbacks for the intelligence service of the 
FRG." It claimed that between January 1984 and June 1985, 168 FRG 
agents had been caught.31 The timing of this most unusual statement, no 
doubt, was linked to the defection of the above-mentioned Tiedge. Until 
his defection, Tiedge had been (from 1982) head of the subdepartment 
for East German espionage in the Federal Office for the Protection of 
the Constitution (Bundesamt fuer Verfassungsschutz, BfV). Tiedge's 
subdepartment resided under the BfV's huge Department V (Counter-
espionage). He was one of the most knowledgeable experts on East Ger-
man espionage operations. He also knew a lot about the techniques of 
West German counter-espionage and those involved in it. His memory 
was excellent. He knew the names of some 160 West German agents and 
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their contacts. Intelligence experts who knew Tiedge well were aware of 
the substantial damage caused by his defection which could cripple West 
German counter-espionage for a number of years. 
One question remained however. Could Tiedge be considered a 
typical "mole" who had passed on information to East Berlin for a 
number of years or had his defection been a purely spontaneous act of 
desperation? If Tiedge had been a mole or a double agent, a further ques-
tion arises, when did his activities for the Eastern bloc start — at the 
beginning of his career with the BfV in 1966 or much later? Most in-
telligence experts believe Tiedge had not been a mole, certainly not from 
the very beginning. Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann noted in 
parliament that the facts surrounding Tiedge's defection pointed in a dif-
ferent direction. The decision to ask for political asylum in the GDR had 
been a panic reaction, he said." 
Tiedge's personal circumstances were distressing. After the tragic 
death of his wife he suffered from one crisis after another. He had a 
serious drinking problem and his debts mounted to over 300,000 German 
Marks. Had Tiedge been in the pay of East Berlin, his debts would most 
likely have been met before they could rise to such proportions. In a let-
ter written shortly after his defection, Tiedge claimed that he had taken 
his decision to do so freely and "in view of the desperate situation I 
found myself in."" One well-informed intelligence expert claims that the 
case of Hansjoachim Tiedge was not a classic case of espionage. Only by 
changing sides had he betrayed his country — he had most probably not 
been recruited by East German intelligence. 
All indications were that he planned his step only in the final week, 
possibly even a few days before.34 By August 1985 Tiedge was aware that 
his position in the BfV's office had become virtually untenable. Thus far 
his boss, BfV president Heribert Hellenbroich, had protected him, but 
Hellenbroich was appointed president of the Federal Intelligence Service 
(BND) on August 1 and his successor at the BfV, Holger Pfahls, was less 
disposed to Tiedge. Pressure by Department IV chief Engelbert Rom-
bach to remove Tiedge as a security risk would probably no longer be 
resisted. Meanwhile Interior Minister Friedrich Zimmermann was not in-
formed of the problems within Department IV. He was only informed of 
Tiedge's disappearance on August 21,1985. Tiedge could not get on with 
his direct chief Engelbert Rombach who had been appointed to his posi-
tion in 1983. Tiedge felt by-passed. When, in the summer of 1985, he 
learned that internal investigations into his rising financial debts had 
started, he suddenly took two days leave after which he disappeared." 
Some other intelligence experts doubt the "panic reaction" theory, 
however. Werner Kahl, for example, suggests that a close associate of 
Tiedge, chief executive officer (Amtsrat) Gruetzfeld who had disap-
peared three years before, could have informed the HVA about Tiedge as 
a possible recruitment target. The HVA subsequently might have in-
structed a double agent to approach and finally recruit Tiedge." Similar-
ly, Karl Wilhelm Fricke, another authoritative West German intelligence 
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expert, considers it likely that Tiedge had cooperated with the other side 
for some time: "It is contrary to all our experience that a man in Tiedge's 
position could change sides without any reassurances or guarantees con-
cerning his livelihood over there."37 
Opinions as to whether Tiedge had been successful in his job also 
differ. One source claims that Tiedge could not possibly have been a 
mole "since he played an essential role in preventing important H VA 
operations in the area of Hamburg in the summer of 1984."3* Others 
claim that the effectiveness of BfV Department IV in combating East 
German espionage operations had significantly dwindled since Tiedge 
became chief of its East German section. In the author's assessment, 
Tiedge had not been a long-time mole in West German counter-
espionage. He could have been "turned" in 1984 or early 1985 but there 
are no indications that he had cooperated with the East Germans in the 
period preceding 1984. 
The sudden disappearance of a number of female secretaries and 
some others in Bonn at roughly the same time can only be explained if 
one assumes that someone with detailed knowledge of West German 
counter-espionage had tipped them off. Had it been Tiedge? In view of 
his position he knew that some East German agents and their contacts 
had come under suspicion. Why did Ursula Richter disappear just a few 
days before Tiedge? Why did other Bonn-based secretaries suddenly 
disappear at about the same time? The only arrest that could be made 
was that of Miss Hoeke who worked for the KGB, not for East Berlin. 
Moreover, Miss Hoeke was arrested after Tiedge had gone and there may 
have been no time to warn her. Tiedge, therefore, might have had a hand 
in the "disappearances" that so shocked Bonn in the summer of 1985. 
All these disappearances can be best explained if one would assume 
that Tiedge had been turned by the East Germans early 1985 or even 
some eight months earlier. By the summer of 1985 it must have become 
psychologically unbearable for Tiedge to continue to act as a double 
agent. Since there was no way out, and his drinking habits and huge 
debts were bound to worsen should he stay in Bonn, Tiedge must have 
seen only one way out — East Berlin. Just before he went, he tipped off 
those East German agents that had come under suspicion and then disap-
peared himself. This theory might be more plausible than the other 
assumptions. 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND MILITARY ESPIONAGE 
The Soviets and their Eastern bloc allies have a long tradition of ac-
quiring western technology by covert means. The new "Gorbachev" 
Party Programme of March 1986 emphasized the need for "a rapid 
renewal of the production apparatus through extensive introduction of 
advanced technology. . . . The introduction of the latest achievements of 
science and technology must be achieved everywhere. Science will 
become in full measure a force directly involved in production."3' 
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Although the gap between Soviet and Western technological 
achievements is rapidly closing, Soviet dependence on Western research and 
know-how is still extensive. Western technology, therefore, is still a major 
target for Soviet and Eastern bloc intelligence. The East German secret ser-
vice is heavily involved in this effort. As early as in 1970, the HVA created 
an entire "Sector for Science and Technology" (SWT) comprising three 
"operational departments" dealing with nuclear technology, micro-
electronics and the construction of engines and vehicles. The importance of 
the SWT markedly increased over the years and significant successes were 
achieved in Europe, Japan and the United States. As far as West Germany 
was concerned, the HVA managed to penetrate a number of firms and 
research centres like Siemens, AEG, Messerschmidt-Boelkow, Blohm, IBM, 
Hoechst and the nuclear research centre in Karlsruhe. Early in 1979 East 
German defector Werner Stiller revealed much of the SWT workings and 
operations in which he himself had been so deeply involved. Stiller had run a 
vast network of informants and agents some of whom were highly qualified 
scientists. On Stiller's instruction, arrests by West German authorities 
followed in seventeen cases while many others managed to escape. Even 
more important were the documents Stiller removed from the HVA files. 
They showed the extent to which the East Germans had penetrated the scien-
tific and technological world in the Federal Republic. Between 1975 and 
1978 some fifty agents provided the HVA with 530 documents on matters of 
science and technology, thus saving the GDR an annual 300 Million German 
Marks in research and development costs. In addition, the HVA could count 
on 400 to 500 informers in West German firms and industry.40 Many of the 
HVA documents Stiller had taken with him were marked "SU," meaning 
that these had to be passed on to the KGB. Stiller further revealed that the 
HVA attempted to stimulate the anti-nuclear movement in West Germany.41 
Scientists, of course, are highly instrumental in obtaining embargoed 
Western technology and know-how. Consequently, the HVA considers 
them a special target for the approaches by their colleagues from the GDR 
"Academy of Sciences" which is heavily penetrated by the HVA. Werner 
Stiller, for example, was the control officer of Dr. Heinz Hillman who was 
in charge of the Academy of Sciences' international relations department. 
"Hillman," Stiller writes, 
had to formally approve all travels to Western countries by 
members of the Academy. Through him I was able to pre-
vent such travels, if I wanted to, or to use the Academy's 
cover for my own agents whom I preferred to send to the 
West. Above all, I learned which GDR academicians 
belonged to the so-called "Travel-cadres" and which ones 
rendered their services to the MfS.42 
According to Stiller, virtually all GDR scientists visiting international con-
ferences performed additional duties for the East German secret service. On-
ly those willing to cooperate receive permission to attend such forums and to 
travel abroad. They are asked to collect as much information as they can 
and approach Western scientists. 
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East German and other Eastern bloc scientists are also expected to 
perform useful propagandistic functions. There is no doubt that Com-
munist intelligence services are behind many "scientists for peace" in-
itiatives, rallying scientists from East and West behind Soviet peace pro-
posals. In East Germany a "Committee of Scientists for Peace and 
Disarmament" (DDR-Kommitee fuer Wissenschaftliche Fragen der 
Sicherung des Friedens und der Abruestung) was formed in May 1983. 
One prominent member of that Committee is Professor Dr. Klaus 
Fuchs.43 Fuchs is hailed in the Soviet media as "an active participant in 
the great campaign against nuclear war." The same Klaus Fuchs, 
however, provided the Soviet Union with the nuclear bomb when he 
spied for the Russians during the time of his involvement in the produc-
tion of the first American atomic bomb." In November 1986, a number 
of East German physicists from the Academy of Sciences issued a call for 
disarmament. Among those who signed it were Klaus Fuchs and Robert 
Rompe. Rompe was identified by Werner Stiller as a long-time and 
trusted KGB and HVA agent.45 
Industrial and technological espionage does not confine itself to 
penetrating the world of scientists. Both the political and business com-
munities are just as important as targets. There are substantial East Ger-
man efforts to lure West German politicians like Oscar Lafontaine, the 
Social Democratic Premier of the highly industralized Saarland, with a 
view to fostering technological and industrial "exchanges" and coopera-
tion. East German secret services even created their own firms in West 
Germany in order to obtain militarily significant technology. According 
to a 1983 West German intelligence report, there is a whole range of 
firms and so-called private enterprises that have been taken over by or set 
up and financed from East Berlin.46 Communist secret services are even 
involved in banking as a way of obtaining access to computer-based data 
of their clients — private individuals as well as business enterprises.47 
Other means of achieving access to the business world of the West is 
through the annual Leipzig trade fair. The MfS runs a special unit 
(Messestab) for the Leipzig trade fair which also contacts hotels and 
private lodgings where Western businessmen stay.48 
By far the majority of industrial and technological espionage serves 
military purposes. Soviet technological advancements have only been 
made possible through meticulous and consistent intelligence gathering 
by the KGB and its sister services. They are assisted by the respective 
military intelligence services — although these often operate on their 
own. Military intelligence also involves penetrating Western military 
establishments (NATO, particularly Afcent, Defence Ministries, US 
military headquarters in Germany, etc.). The most recent case of military 
espionage in Germany was that of Juergen Westphal, until his arrest a 
high-ranking official in the West German Ministry of Defence. In the 
summer of 1986 Mr. Westphal had been recruited by a man introducing 
himself as "Dr. Sternberg." It is assumed that "Dr. Sternberg" was an 
officer of the East German HVA or of East German military intelligence 
(Verwaltung Aufklaerung). Westphal had access to documents classified 
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"secret." What made things worse was the fact that Westphal was quite 
familiar with the computer- and data-network of the West German army. 
He was particularly involved in long-range planning for the armed forces.4' 
This might explain why the East Germans rewarded him so highly. 
Military intelligence in the GDR is conducted from the "Department of 
Intelligence" which is part of the Ministry of Defence. To conduct military 
intelligence more effectively, Soviet and East European services avail 
themselves extensively of lorry drivers. These lorries frequently follow 
strange detours and are often spotted near airfields, military or naval bases. 
It is assumed that there are special elite forces among, particularly, the 
Soviet lorry drivers — so-called "spetznaz" or sabotage units.50 West Euro-
pean intelligence experts claim that East German, Czech and Polish lorry 
drivers have frequently been involved in spying and reconnaissance missions 
in Sweden, West Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands.51 The East Ger-
man state firm of "Deutrans" has close links with the intelligence services. 
Its lorries cover most of West Europe but particularly the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS 
It would be wrong to assume that the dawning era of "glasnost" in the 
Soviet Union, however significant, would automatically curb the vast in-
telligence effort on the part of the Communist secret services. As one of the 
most efficient Eastern bloc services, the East German secret service (HVA) 
has achieved much success both in the realm of political espionage and the 
realm of industrial and technological intelligence. The Soviet and East Ger-
man secret services concentrate heavily on West Germany which is con-
sidered one of the most important targets in Europe. Quite worrisome is the 
fact that the number of undetected spies is far greater than the number 
detected. Then there are those whose public exposure is hampered for 
political reasons. 
When in the summer of 1985, some highly placed female secretaries in 
Bonn disappeared into East Berlin it suddenly dawned on many that those 
female agents had worked in Ministries and other governmental or political 
bodies for years without arousing the slightest suspicion. The Guillaume af-
fair showed that high level penetration of political parties is a reality. A well-
known West German politician who makes frequent trips to the East, is 
suspected of having been recruited by the KGB in the sixties or even earlier. 
Should these suspicions prove to be well-founded, a political row far sur-
passing the Guillaume affair would be bound to follow. Referring to this 
case, an intelligence expert told the author: "West Germany is just one ma-
jor security risk. Not only is it an essential target for Soviet and East German 
penetration efforts but it also provides unique opportunities for their secret 
services."52 
On the other hand one must not be tempted to exaggerate the successes 
and possibilities of East German espionage operations. There have been 
serious failures and setbacks as with the defection of Werner Stiller who, 
even before his actual defection, started cooperating with West German 
counter-intelligence (BND). Although such setbacks do cripple East 
60 
Conflict Quarterly 
German operations for a time, recovery always follows sooner or later. 
Western intelligence, therefore, must not depend solely on one defector 
or double-agent in the other camp but on many. 
Western counter-espionage efforts often are seriously hampered in 
that political considerations or "party politics" thwart some of the most 
promising operations. Soviet and East German spies in the Federal 
Republic of Germany can harm essential Western interests purely 
because they enjoyed the full confidence of a high-ranking politician. 
Guenter Guillaume, for example, got his post because his friends in the 
Social Democrat Party trusted and protected him. Although they were 
aware that he came originally from East Germany, they declined to make 
any serious security checks. At that time, the dominant mood in the par-
ty was rather anti-intelligence. It was assumed that intelligence and 
counter-espionage aimed at the Eastern bloc was a relic of the Cold War, 
now rapidly being replaced by an openness towards the East. 
What is needed, then, is a proper balance between political respon-
sibility and intelligence or counter-espionage operations. Too much 
"oversight" — however necessary and useful "oversight" may be — 
would cripple necessary operations and eventually harm those bearing 
political responsibility. On the other hand, too much leeway for the ser-
vices would result in these services becoming too powerful and eventually 
forming a sort of police state — as is the case in the Societ Union and 
Eastern Europe. 
Communist secret services, and the East German secret service in 
particular, are powerful adversaries whose activities are ignored at one's 
peril. It is through close cooperation between those bearing political 
responsibility in a parliamentary democracy and the secret services that 
the detrimental effects of hostile intelligence operations can be rendered 
harmless. 
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